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The emergence of stablecoins is a growing concern for authorities worldwide including 
Indonesia as it could affect financial stability. Thus, if a central bank chooses to develop 
a central bank digital currency (CBDC) to tackle this problem, the design should 
conform to the country’s characteristics and consumer needs. This study draws on 
experts’ opinions from various economic agents and utilises an amalgamation of the 
analytic network process (ANP) and the Delphi method to show that the cash-like 
CBDC model is the most appropriate digital currency design for Indonesia, since it 
could enhance financial inclusion and reduce shadow banking in Indonesia.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this study, we identify the most suitable CBDC design for Indonesia. The 
presence of digital currencies as a result of technological innovation and the 
need to reduce the use of cash presents new challenges for economic agents, 
including central banks. These changes in the payment landscape are marked 
by new players offering the provision of virtual currency, as well as, by big 
technology (big tech) and financial technology (fintech) firms providing financial 
services (BIS, 2020).1 While providing alternatives to traditional payment systems, 
which have the potential to lower transaction costs, digital currencies also pose 
significant risks and problems (Latimer & Duffy, 2019). Cryptocurrencies, such as 
Bitcoin and Ethereum, are highly volatile and lack guaranteed convertibility and 
security (Beau, 2020).2 The recent introduction of stablecoins solves this issue of 
price stability3. However, it does not offer services, in terms of asset settlements, 
especially those used interchangeably between commercial bank money and 
central bank money (Beau, 2020). Despite the fact that big tech and fintech firms 
are ushering in a more consumer-centric experience through the use of data 
analytics, customer omnichannels which overlay services, and lending provisions 
(P2P), the credit risks involved in using stablecoins are high (Petralia, Philippon, 
Rice, & Veron, 2019). These firms have grown significantly in China, and are 
starting to become more active in other developing countries, such as India and 
Indonesia (Petralia et al., 2019), although only concentrated in major cities for the 
latter (Iman, 2018).
Alongside with its prominent millennial population4, massive internet 
penetration5, immense electronic money adoption6 and 130 million Facebook users7, 
Indonesia is a huge potential market for stablecoins penetration, especially for the 
Facebook Libra platform. Although Indonesia prohibits the use of digital currency 
(including stablecoins) as a means of payment, the public has the opportunity to 
own and use Libra as a cryptoasset if the asset is traded in Indonesia through an 
official exchange (registered under the authority of Bappebti8). Thus, there is a risk 
of regulatory arbitrage in the use of cryptoassets that can still be used as a medium 
of exchange, especially for online/e-commerce transactions. Therefore, the risks to 
1 Advances in financial technology (fintech) is one of the major drivers in the rapid growth of non-
bank institutions that provide financial services, namely shadow banking (see Sheng & Soon, 2016).
2 The volatility of these digital currencies could worsen following the disruption of markets, which 
has been fueled by the COVID-19 pandemic (see Devpura and Narayan, 2020; Iyke, 2020a,b; Phan 
and Narayan, 2020; Vidya and Prabheesh, 2020; Narayan, 2020a, b, c; Salisu Sikiru, 2020; Narayan et 
al. 2020).
3 Stablecoins are digital currencies which rely on a set of stabilization method to minimize the 
fluctuation of its values (Bullman, Klemm, & Pinna, 2019). The first stable coin is “Realcoin” and 
later renamed into “Tether” which was first announced in July 2014.
4 Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistics projects that Indonesia’s millennials (i.e. the population age 
between 21 – 36) would be 63,5 million people by 2020 (IDN Research Institute, 2020).
5 Indonesia is the fourth largest country with the highest number of internet users in the world (171,26 
million users), after China (854 million users), India (560 million users), and United States (313,2 
million users) (Statista, 2020).
6 The growth rate of electronic money adoption is 70,7% per annum as at May-2020 (Bank Indonesia).
7 See Statista (2020).
8 The commodity futures trading supervisor in Indonesia.
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the financial system stability and consumer protection issues need to be addressed 
if stablecoins become publicly accepted. 
Various policies are embraced by central banks, so that households and 
businesses can still have secure and efficient payment choices (BIS, 2020). In 
China, the central bank improved information transparency and ensured that the 
circulation of money outside of the bank will return to the banking system, by 
providing payment system infrastructure, as well as, imposing prudent regulations 
(Qian, 2019). However, these proved to be costly, in terms of its regulation and 
policy. Meanwhile, other central banks chose the CBDC in smoothing the payment 
system and improving the soundness of monetary policy (Qian, 2019). Since 
developing the CBDC is also very costly and risky for central banks (Zang, 2020), 
proper planning is required. 
These issues triggered several central banks to develop their CBDCs and 
spurred a growing research on CBDCs. Initially, there were two major types of 
CBDC studies: firstly, those which focused on the definition and characteristics of 
CBDCs (see, for example, CPMI, 2015; Gouveia et al., 2017; Bech and Garratt, 2017) 
and secondly, studies which explored the use of CBDCs (see, example, Boar et al., 
2020; Meaning, 2017). However, the literature is still at the nascent stage and does 
not explore the design process of CBDCs. Nevertheless, understanding what goes 
into the designing of CBDCs is necessary to meet the everchanging public needs 
and to conform to a country’s unique characteristics.
Like in other countries, the literature on CBDCs in the Indonesian context is 
limited and is dominated by the central bank’s studies.9 In general, the Indonesian 
CBDC literature can be divided into three major group of studies: those focusing on 
the description of the CBDC and its uses worldwide (such as, Peranginangin et al., 
2006; Hutabarat et al., 2016, 2018); those focusing on the potential implications of 
CBDC implementation (Yosamartha et al., 2017); and those focusing on designing 
the CBDC scheme for Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2018). The last group is quite 
unique, because such studies are very scarce. In fact, to our knowledge, only Bank 
Indonesia (2018) offered recommendations for implementing the CBDC scheme 
in Indonesia. However, since all these studies were conducted by the monetary 
authority, they did not offer a conceptual CBDC model that fits Indonesian 
conditions because they were mainly derived from regulators’ perspective. 
Moreover, these studies only relied on literature review and excluded a systematic 
approach to designing the CBDC model. Therefore, further research is necessary 
to better understand the motivation and design criteria of the CBDC. 
Hence, this study constructs a conceptual framework to identify the most 
suitable CBDC design for Indonesia. Based on this conceptual framework, the 
study also analyses and proposes a specific CBDC model, which corresponds 
to the Indonesian conditions by utilizing primary data, unlike previous studies. 
We expand the CBDC literature, in general, by exploring the CBDC design 
through systematic decision-making process, and by taking into consideration the 
perspective of regulators, academicians and market practitioners in Indonesia. To 
achieve this goal, we introduce a novel method, which combines the ANP and 
9 It should be noted that even though the central bank have extensive research on CBDC, it cannot be 
concluded that Indonesia will implement CBDC in the near future.
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the Delphi method, robust to the endogeneity problem. Our Delphi–ANP method 
involves regulators, academicians, and experts, prioritizing the best model criteria 
by considering interdependencies between the criteria. We then further refined the 
model using the Delphi method to identify the CBDC model criteria appropriate 
for Indonesia. 
The study revealed that the CBDC model best suited for Indonesia is the cash-
like CBDC model, a general-purpose (retail) CBDC, which shares very similar 
characteristics to traditional currencies, in that it is universal, anonymous, peer-to-
peer, and non-yield bearing. This finding is similar to the CBDC models currently 
developed by the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), which PwC (2019) suggests is 
similar to the current Indonesian fintech landscape. 
Regulators and market practitioners can benefit from this study, since it 
designs and implements a suitable CBDC model for the Indonesian environment. 
Our study offers a fresh perspective on CBDCs as it develops a novel approach, 
combining the Delphi method with the ANP method, and uses experts’ opinions 
to derive the most suitable CBDC model for Indonesia. Our approach can therefore 
be combined with existing exploratory-based approaches to design robust CBDC 
platforms for countries like Indonesia. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the 
literature on CBDCs and how it relates to the implementation of a CBDC in 
Indonesia, Section 3 explains our methodology, Section 4 discusses the findings, 
and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The development of digital currency is inseparable from the thought of Friedrich 
Hayek10, a Nobel Laureate in economics, who suggested that the government should 
not have monopoly over the issuance of money (Hayek, 1990). The introduction of 
Bitcoin in 2008 could end the monopoly of money creation from the central bank 
as Hayek thought (Nabilou, 2019; Gans & Halaburda, 2015)11. Since 2008, Bitcoin 
and several other digital currencies12 have become alternative means of payment, 
despite state money (Dwyer, 2015). On the whole, these currencies brought upon 
major innovations to the traditional payment system: changing physical currency 
to its digital form, private issuance, and technological innovation (Auer & Bohme, 
2020; Velde, 2013). Currently over 600 digital currencies operate throughout the 
internet and substantially borderless system (Latimer & Duffy, 2019).
In response to the global spread of digital currencies, international agencies 
and central banks published reports assessing their shortcomings. The European 
Banking Authority (EBA), Financial Action Task Force (FATF), European Central 
Bank (ECB), and the Deutsche Bank focus on the fact that virtual currency is an 
unregulated digital money that can be transferred, stored, and traded electronically 
10 Friedrich Hayek was an English-Austrian economist and a Nobel Laureate in economics for his 
theory of money and economic fluctuations (Schrepel, 2014).
11 The digital currency named Bitcoin was conceived by Satoshi Nakamoto (pseudonym identity) and 
made available to user group on the internet in 2008 (Elendner et al., 2018) (Dwyer, 2015) (Bohme et 
al., 2015). 
12 Digital currencies are cryptocurrencies or virtual currencies, which do not physically exist as a coin 
or note (Latimer & Duffy, 2019; Motsi-Omoijiade, 2018; Michaels & Homer, 2018).
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and does not have legal tender status (Mobert, 2018; ECB, 2012). Additionally, 
even though virtual currency operates like a currency in some environment, it 
could not give the public confidence that its value is relatively stable over time 
(Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017; Gerstein & Hervieux-Payette, 2015). As such, there is no 
common consensus on the definition of digital currency but a profound similarity 
is that it is not issued or guaranteed by any jurisdiction and is unable to perform 
the essential functions of money (McKinney et al., 2015). Digital currency is also 
too volatile to be a reliable store of value, is not widely accepted as a means of 
exchange, and is not used as a unit of account (BOE, 2020)
As technology continues to develop, new forms of money are also emerging. 
Some privately issued stablecoins aim to overcome the shortcomings of digital 
currencies and provide stability of value via some form of backing (Mancini-
Griffoli & Adrian, 2019). However, the emergence of stablecoins13 have become 
a growing concern for authorities worldwide. Stablecoins could affect financial 
stability, if many people make the switch, especially if a depreciation in domestic 
currency seems imminent (Mancini-Griffoli & Adrian, 2019).14 For example, 
stablecoins, such as Libra, could have broader impact because people tend to be 
global followers. Moreover, the use of multiplatform Libra through social media 
could escalate the adoption rate of stablecoins. Indonesia’s status as the third 
largest Facebook user in the world15 has made the country a potential market for 
Libra but has also exposed it to the risks associated with this currency. Stablecoins 
could potentially be widely adopted over existing payment systems, according 
to a recent study.16 But given the risks they could pose, it may be worth asking 
whether the CBDC can be designed to better meet people needs and conform to a 
country’s characteristics.17
Although the term of CBDC includes the words digital currency, CBDC is 
fundamentally different from digital currency. As a Central Bank Money (CeBM), 
CBDC is a central bank’s liability denominated in the local unit of account, which 
can be used as a medium of exchange and store of value (CPMI, 2018). The main 
difference between CBDC and digital currency is the level of centralization in 
the creation, settlement and destruction process, which is centralized under the 
control of the central bank and its status as a legal tender (Mohamed, 2020; Bohme 
et al., 2015; Nabilou, 2019). Bech & Garratt (2017) divide CBDC into two models, 
namely wholesale and general-purpose CBDC. They combine the dimension of 
digital currency with the taxonomy of money, known as the Money Flower.18 This 
taxonomy was then further developed by CPMI (2018), which stated that CBDC 
13 Stablecoins create digital tokens or coins and are intended for use either in retail or wholesale 
payment systems, i.e. thether, libra, JPM coin, and signet (Mohacsi, 2020; G7 Working Group on 
Stablecoins, 2019).
14 See also G7 Working Group on Stablecoins (2019).
15 Leading countries based on Facebook audience are India (280 million), USA (190 million), and 
Indonesia (130 million) (Statista, 2020).
16 See G7 Working Group on Stablecoins (2019).
17 The emergence of stablecoins brings potential risk on financial integrity, anti-money laundering 
regime, consumer and data protection, cyber resilience and tax compliance (G7 Working Group on 
Stablecoins, 2019).
18 For early CBDC concept and the development of money flower taxonomy, see CPMI (2015), Bech & 
Garratt (2017) and Bjerg (2017).
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can be account-based or token-based. According to CPMI (2018) there are three 
CBDC models, namely general-purpose token, wholesale token, and general-
purpose accounts.19 The motive of CBDC issuance might differ in each jurisdiction. 
This motive leads to the design of CBDC based on its features, namely anonymity, 
availability, interest-bearing, limits on holding, and transfer mechanism (CPMI, 
2018).
Over the last decade, there are more authorities working on the design and 
implementation of CBDC, focusing on either the wholesale or general-purpose 
models. Bank of Canada’s Jasper Project, Bank of Thailand’s Inthanon Project, the 
South African Reserve Bank’s Khokha Project, and the Deutsche Bundesbank’s 
Blockbaster Project are wholesale-based CBDCs used for interbank payments 
(Lannquist, 2019; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2018). Moreover, the wholesale CBDC 
in cross-border payments has been explored by the European Central Bank and 
the Bank of Japan in the Stella Project, as well as, by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore in Project Ubin (Lannquist, 2019). These CBDC projects are generally 
running on the Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) based platforms.
Unlike the wholesale CDBC model, the general-purpose CBDC is conducted 
either on the DLT or non-DLT platforms. The Riksbank, People Bank of China, 
and governments of Tunisia and Venezuela utilised the DLT on their CBDC pilot 
(Shirai, 2019). In contrast, the Dinero Electronico Project by Bank of Equador 
and the e-Peso Project by Bank of Uruguay were conducted on non-DLT based 
platforms (Barontini & Holden, 2019). All in all, the chosen CBDC model has a 
correlation with the motive of the central bank or government as the issuer. The 
general-purpose CBDC model is broadly related to issues around cash, responding 
to dwindling use, dollarization, shadow banking or financial inclusion, while the 
motivation for using wholesale CBDC is to improve payment efficiency and safety 
(Barontini & Holden, 2019). 
Prior studies on CBDC focused more on its implications, particularly on the 
stability of the financial system, monetary policy, as well as, on the payment system 
(CPMI, 2018; BOE, 2020). Besides, most of these studies only provide an overview 
of the CBDC models that are being implemented in emerging economies (Boar et 
al., 2020; Shirai, 2019; Barontini & Holden, 2019; Hileman & Rauchs, 2017). As an 
emerging economy, there is also a growing interest to deepen the understanding 
of CBDCs in Indonesia. 
The literature discussing CBDCs in Indonesia is scarce, and the few studies 
are mostly conducted by the central bank. This literature covers the description 
of CBDC concept and its worldwide use (Hutabarat et al., 2018; Bank Indonesia, 
2017; Perangingangin et al., 2016), the potential implications of CBDCs, with 
respect to monetary policy, financial stability, payment system, information 
technology, and legal aspects (Kinanthi et al., 2019; Sahabat et al., 2017; Harahap 
et al., 2017; Yosamartha et al., 2017; Trianti et al., 2017; Bank Infonesia, 2017), and 
the design of CBDC for Indonesia (Bank Indonesia, 2018). However, none of these 
19 Following CPMI (2018), the term ‘general purpose (GP)’ refers to the CBDC that is intended for use 
by anyone (broad access) and ‘wholesale’ refers to the CBDC, which accessible to selected parties. 
The GP model could be arranged in a token or account based, while the wholesale CBDC can ideally 
be implemented in token form only. 
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studies utilised primary data. We add to these studies using primary data and 
a systematic approach in order to propose the most suitable CBDC model for 
Indonesia. This CBDC model takes into account the country’s conditions and will 
therefore minimize the risks associated with digital currencies.
Nugroho (2018) evaluates CBDCs based on their transaction cost.20 He focuses 
on finding which economic agent will bear most transaction costs when CBDCs 
are introduced. Our study follows Nugroho (2018), in that it involves the opinions 
or perspectives of other entities—beside central banks—to minimize biases in the 
determination the most suitable CBDC design for Indonesia. However, unlike 
Nugroho (2018), our study involves a wide range of experts, in order to better 
represent various agents in the economy. The range of respondents are from the 
fiscal regulatory, diverse divisions of the central bank (monetary, macroprudential, 
and payment system divisions), commercial banks, academicians, and payment 
system providers (fintech), since Indonesia is one of the countries, whose fintech 
industry is growing rapidly in Southeast Asia (Euromonitor, 2020; PwC, 2019; 
Minerva, 2016). These experts’ opinions formed the foundation on which we 
devised the CBDC model that conforms to the country’s characteristics. 
Our study is also in line with Auer & Bohme (2020), who contended that the 
design of a CBDC model should be based on an approach that caters for consumer 
needs. We show that the cash-like CBDC model is the most applicable design for 
Indonesia using the Delphi–ANP approach, which draws on experts’ opinions. 
This general-purpose model could enhance financial inclusion and reduce shadow 
banking that tend to be challenges in emerging economies (Boar, Holden, & 
Wadsworth, 2020; Qian, 2019).
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data
The study uses primary data derived from in-depth interviews, Focus Group 
Discussions (FGD) and questionnaires. Our sample involved 18 respondents, 
who represent economic agents, such as the government (central bank and fiscal 
regulator), firms (commercial banks and payment system providers/fintech 
providers), and individual/households (academicians). The number of respondents 
in this study outweighs the ideal number for organising small FGD, which generally 
range from four to six respondents (Gibbs, 1997). However, according to Ascarya 
(2014), Sakti et al. (2019), and Ziglio (1996), mastery and competence in their 
respective fields are the most important factors to be considered when selecting 
respondents for the ANP–Delphi method. Hence, the number of respondents does 
not matter.
20 Nugroho (2018) use transaction cost economics (TCE) framework to evaluate CBDC design. The 
coverage of transaction costs consists of three transactional dimensions: uncertainty, transaction 
frequency, and asset specificity.
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B. Research Methodology
Our study can be considered as a frontier research, since the CBDC has not yet been 
implemented in any country. Therefore, the ANP method is utilised to organise 
thoughts, experiences, and to elicit judgments recorded in memory and quantify 
them in the form of priorities, as well as, allow for the representation of diverse 
opinions after discussion and debate (Saaty & Vargas, 2006). The ANP method helps 
by providing a decision-making framework for choosing the best CBDC model for 
a country. While Boar et al. (2020), Shirai (2019), Barontini & Holden (2019), and 
Nugroho (2018) used a survey to conduct further analysis about CBDC designs 
in certain jurisdictions, we use the ANP method to gain a deeper understanding 
about a CBDC design which conforms to a country’s characteristics and any other 
important criteria. The model is then be further refined using the Delphi method 
to identify the CBDC model criteria that accommodate local wisdom in Indonesia. 
We discuss the Delphi–ANP method, in more detail, in what follows. 
C. The Delphi–ANP Method
The ANP is a mathematical theory that is able to analyse the effect of elements 
which interact by using an assumptions approach to solve problems. The ANP 
method explains the dependent factors and the network feedback for decision-
making through the consideration and validation of empirical experience (Saaty, 
2001). By using network feedback, elements can depend on components, such as 
the hierarchical network, but can also be relied on by other elements (Saaty L. T., 
2005). The ANP can easily be applied to decision-making, evaluation, forecasting, 
mapping, strategising, and the allocation of resources (Saaty & Vargas, 2006). 
The Delphi method uses a survey approach, consisting of two or more 
repetitive processes to collect data and refine data, with the series of processes 
and analyses accompanied by feedback (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). This method 
encourages participants to give an opinion and an initial assessment of the 
formation of the CBDC model in Indonesia. The main characteristic of the Delphi 
method is the participant feedback process that can be controlled to reduce noise 
through a problem-solving orientation. The Delphi method contains a scope for 
evaluating, finding facts, exploring problems, and being a flexible tool for analysis. 
As discussed in III.1, we collected data through FGDs made up of regulators, 
academicians, and practitioners. By combining the Delphi method with the ANP 
method, we involved experts in a participatory and consensus development 
process to eliminate inaccurate information about CBDC with respect to the 
Indonesian economic conditions. Following Ascarya (2014), the Delphi–ANP 
method is displayed Figure 1.
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We delivered questionnaires to respondents in order to establish the criteria 
and elements formed. After receiving the responses from the respondents, we 
refined the questionnaires, redistributed, and recollected them to ensure that they 
are well-structured. We then reused the compiled questionnaires as a questionnaire 
instrument in the second round of data collection. The construction of the ANP 
model is based on theoretical and empirical literature reviews and poses questions 
to respondents through in-depth interviews. At the in-depth interview stage, we 
carried out the Delphi method to obtain the final results that will determine the 
criteria in the ANP model.
The quantification stage of the model uses the questions in the ANP 
questionnaires in the form of a pairwise comparison between elements in the 
cluster to establish which of the two has a greater influence, where the size of 
the difference is on a numerical scale from 1 to 9 (Saaty, 2005; Saaty & Vargas, 
2006). The influence of feedback in ANP framework requires a large matrix named 





























This figure shows the Delphi–ANP method used in our study. Stage 1 starts from literature review and terminates at 
Delphi ranking. In Stage 2, we construct and validate the ANP model. Stage 3 designs pairwise questionnaires and 
synthesises and analyses data. Stage 4 validates and interprets the results. 
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Assume that cluster h, denoted by Ch, h=1,..., N, has nh elements. Elements in 
cluster h, denoted by eh1, eh1, … , , where wij is named a block of the supermatrix. 
To produce the ratio scale, we use three calculations from the supermatrix (1), 
consisting of: (i) Unweighted Supermatrix, which is the original of column 
eigenvectors obtained from the paired comparison matrix of elements; (ii) 
Weighted Supermatrix, where each block of column eigenvector from a cluster 
is weighted with priority of the influence of each cluster; and (iii) Limiting 
Supermatrix, obtained by lifting a weighted supermatrix with a large rank (Saaty 
& Vargas, 2006).
D. The Benefit, Opportunity, Cost, Risk Approach
Our Delphi–ANP method entails the Benefit, Opportunity, Cost, Risk (BOCR) 
approach, which helps in determining the priorities for selecting the best CBDC 
model based on calculating the desired criteria (benefits) and unwanted criteria 
(costs), as well as, the criteria based on events in the future, which may occur as 
positive things (opportunities) and things that can lead to negative effect (risks) 
(Saaty & Vargas, 2006; Simelyte et al., 2014). 
The prioritised alternatives are obtained from three results: standard condition 
(B/C), pessimistic (B/(C×R)), and realistic ((B×O)/(C ×R)). To make the final decision, 
Wijnmalen (2007) and Simelyte et al. (2014) recommend employing five different 












where b, o, c, and r are normalised weights of merits B, O, C, and R, respectively; 
Bi, Oi, Ci, and Ri represent the synthesised results of the alternative I under merit 
B, O, C, and R, respectively.
Equation (2), the marginal value for short-term decision formula, in which 
benefit is multiplied by opportunity, divided by costs multiplied by risk for each 
alternative is expected yield negative results. This method obtains marginal value, 
and is considered as a method to synthesise a short-term decision. Meanwhile, 
Equation (3), the marginal value for long-term decision formula, is considered as 
a method to synthesise a long-term decision (Saaty and Özdemir, 2005; Saaty and 
De Paola, 2017).
E. Model Construction and Robustness Checks
We employed a the two-layer ANP model. The first layer includes two main 
clusters, namely (i) strategic criteria cluster and (ii) BOCR cluster, where each of 
the cluster has four sub-clusters with different elements. The design of the elements 
are derived from the identification of problems carried out through the literature 
review process and strengthened through the FGD process. The second layer 
is BOCR cluster, which consists of sub-clusters, namely benefits, opportunities, 
costs and risks. Each of the sub-clusters is linked to the respective CBDC design 
alternative clusters consisting of model 1 (cash-like), model 2 (general purpose, 
indirect, non-interest bearing), model 3 (wholesale, direct, interest bearing), model 
4 (wholesale, direct, non interest bearing), and model 5 (general purpose, direct, 
interest bearing). The two-layer ANP model is displayed in Figure 2. 
In a robustness check, we analyze how the model behaves when the 
specifications are changed. We utilize two approaches in order to perform the 
robustness check. In the first, we use a conceptual framework for the one-layer 
ANP model to check whether the two-layer ANP model is robust. If the results 
change due to changes in the model are not significant or are relatively small, then 
we can interpret this as evidence of the structural validity of our model (Xun & 
Halbert, 2014). Unlike the two-layer ANP model, the one-layer ANP model does 
not distinguish between alternatives in each aspect of benefit, opportunity, cost, 
and risk. The second approach involves using sensitivity analysis on the chosen 
alternative model, also understood as a dynamic analysis, used to examine the 
effect of variations in assessment of the stability of the final result. We performed 
the sensitivity analysis to determine whether the overall results (obtained using 
the alternative models) vary, if there is a change in the relationship, in terms of 
benefits, opportunities, costs, and risks (Saaty & Vargas, 2006). 
(6)
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Model Validity: Rater Agreement of Delphi-Likert and Delphi-ANP
The initial assessment of the Delphi-Likert process is carried out to validate the 
convergence of the respondents’ opinions from the Delphi FGD and to obtain 
a valid model construction. The assessment is processed to display the level of 
agreement (rater agreement) or Kendall’s W to the clusters and elements that have 
been formed. 
The first half of Table 1 shows that, in the first round, 10 of the 11 clusters 
in the model reached the same consensus (or converged), as indicated by the 
significance (p-value) on the Kendall’s W value, which is a reflection of the value of 
the rater agreement. In the second round, after adjusting for outlier answers, the 
cluster function attains significance at the 10% level when it had previously been 
insignificant. Thus, there has been consensus in all clusters in the construction of 
the ANP model. This shows that the construction of the ANP model in this study 
can be considered valid.
The Delphi–ANP process is carried out to determine the consistency of the 
respondents’ assessment in the level of agreement of each cluster. The ranking 
results and opinions were recapitulated for elimination based on the five elements 
Figure 2. 
ANP 2-Layer Model
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that obtained the highest geometric ranking values for each cluster. The second 
half of Table 1 shows that 9 of the 11 clusters in the model reach convergent 
answers. In the second round, after adjusting the outliers among the respondents’ 
answers in the opportunities and cost clusters, the value becomes significant at the 
10% significance level. The consensus in all clusters shows that the ANP model can 
be considered valid.
Table 1.
 Rater Agreement of Delphi–Likert and Delphi–ANP
This table shows the value of the level of agreement (rater agreement) or W-Kendall for clusters and elements that 
have been formed in Delphi-Likert and Delphi-ANP. A significant level of agreement value can also be seen from the 
p-value at *, **, and *** denote significance at the10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
CLUSTER
Delphi- Likert Delphi-ANP


















Criteria 0.175 0.098* 0.175 0.098* 0.265 0.002*** 0.265 0.002***
Objective 0.225 0.005** 0.225 0.005** 0.153 0.026** 0.153 0.026**
Function 0.098 0.272 0.147 0.088* 0.427 0.000*** 0.427 0.000***
Characteristic 0.284 0.001*** 0.284 0.001*** 0.426 0.000*** 0.426 0.000***
Motives 0.471 0.000*** 0.471 0.000*** 0.588 0.000*** 0.588 0.000***
Bocr Criteria 0.316 0.006*** 0.316 0.006*** 0.211 0.009*** 0.211 0.009***
Benefit 0.318 0.000*** 0.318 0.000*** 0.165 0.018** 0.165 0.018**
Opportunities 0.306 0.000*** 0.306 0.000*** 0.099 0.128 0.129 0.054*
Costs 0.228 0.003*** 0.228 0.003*** 0.058 0.382 0.128 0.055*
Risk 0.182 0.008*** 0.182 0.009*** 0.134 0.047** 0.134 0.047**
Alternative 
(Design) 0.155 0.018** 0.155 0.018** 0.169 0.016** 0.169 0016**
B. Priority Cluster and Sub-Cluster
B1. Priority Cluster in Strategic Criteria
The results of the two-layer ANP with BOCR approach for the whole of the 
strategic criteria cluster, shown in Table 2, reveal that the main priority of the 
strategic criteria when establishing the CBDC model in Indonesia is objective 
(39%), followed by characteristic and function clusters, which have the same 
value (24%), and motive (14%). Meanwhile, the value of the rater agreement in the 
criteria strategy cluster shows the agreement value for practitioners, academician, 
and overall respondents. This is also indicated by the statistical significance at 10% 
level (see the p-values).
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 23, Number 3, 2020424
Table 2 also displays the highest inconsistency values of the respondents’ 
pairwise comparison of answers for the relationships between clusters in the ANP 
network. It can be concluded that the cluster strategy consistency test results for 
the two-layer ANP with the BOCR approach meet the consistency requirements of 
the respondents’ answers because the inconsistency value is less than 10%.
B2. Priority Sub-Cluster in Strategic Criteria
The results for the two-layer ANP with the BOCR approach, in Table 3, show that 
the respondents generally agreed that the main strategy using the objective cluster 
for CBDC issuance is a smooth payment system (25%), strengthening the stability 
of the financial system, and interoperability (25%), followed by the supervision 
of national financial transactions, and efficiency of money distribution (12%). The 
value of the rater agreement in the objective cluster shows the agreement value for 
the practitioner category and overall respondents per category, as indicated by the 
p-values, which are significant at 5% and 10% levels.
Table 2. 
Strategic Criteria Two-Layer ANP Model
This table shows the geometric mean values for the priority values  of each category of respondents, the value of 
agreement level based on Kendall’s W and the value of the consistency of answers based on the inconsistency value 
in the strategic criteria cluster. Note that, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
 Practitioner Academicians Regulator All R
 1. Objective 0.430 0.371 0.308 0.392 1
 2. Function 0.190 0.167 0.308 0.236 3
 3. Characteristic 0.190 0.349 0.246 0.236 2
 4. Motive 0.190 0.113 0.138 0.137 4
 Inconsistency 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.007
 Kendall’s W 0.378 0.353 0.106 0.158
 X2 6.800 6.350 1.900 8.550
 p-value 0.079* 0.096* 0.593 0.036**
Table 3.
Detailed ANP Strategic Criteria Results
This table shows the geometric mean value to see the priority value of each category of respondents, the value of 
agreement level based on Kendall’s W and the value of the consistency of answers based on the value of inconsistencies 
in the Strategic Criteria cluster in detail. Note that, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.
Practitioner  Academicians Regulator All R
OBJECTIVE
1. Smooth payment system 0.106 0.464 0.274 0.250 1
2. Surveillance of national transaction 0.153 0.102 0.239 0.125 5
3. Efficiency in printing & handling 
money 0.294 0.123 0.062 0.125 4
4. Interoperability 0.294 0.123 0.150 0.250 3
5. Strengthen financial system stability 0.153 0.189 0.274 0.250 2
Inconsistency 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kendall’s W 0.329 0.257 0.185 0.219
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Table 3.
Detailed ANP Strategic Criteria Results (Continued)
Practitioner  Academicians Regulator All R
X2 7.900 6.167 4.433 15.75
p-value 0.095** 0.187 0.351 0.003***
FUNCTION
 1. Medium of Exchange 0.167 0.264 0.356 0.255 1
 2. Means of Payment 0.263 0.264 0.236 0.221 2
 3. Store of Value 0.287 0.144 0.130 0.221 3
 4. Unit of Account 0.158 0.264 0.200 0.221 4
 5. Standard of Deferred Payment 0.124 0.065 0.078 0.081 5
 Inconsistency 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Kendall’s W 0.163 0.201 0.171 0.144
 X2 3.900 4.833 4.100 10.367
p-value 0.420 0.305 0.393 0.035**
CHARACTERISTIC
 1. Universally Accepted 0.430 0.377 0.397 0.442 1
 2. Non-Yield Bearing 0.274 0.225 0.275 0.191 2
 3. Anonymity 0.068 0.068 0.063 0.068 5
 4. Peer to Peer 0.114 0.262 0.165 0.191 3
 5. Pseudonymous 0.114 0.068 0.100 0.109 4
 Inconsistency 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
 Kendall’s W 0.161 0.426 0.263 0.243
 X2 3.867 10.233 6.313 17.46
p-value 0.424 0.037** 0.177 0.002***
MOTIVE
 1. Transaction 0.341 0.475 0.348 0.392 1
 2. Interparty Trust 0.341 0.124 0.348 0.255 2
 3. Saving/Investment 0.142 0.204 0.091 0.145 3
 4. Precautionary 0.094 0.124 0.149 0.145 4
 5. Philanthropy 0.082 0.072 0.063 0.063 5
 Inconsistency 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
 Kendall’s W 0.513 0.490 0.518 0.451
 X2 12.30 11.78 12.43 32.47
p-value 0.015** 0.019** 0.014** 0.000***
The ANP results for the CBDC issuance sub-cluster function demonstrate 
that respondents generally agreed that “medium of change” (25%) is the most 
important element, followed by “means of payment”, “unit of account” and “store 
of value”, all of which had the same value (22%) and, finally, the “standard of 
deferred payment” element (8%). The value of the rater agreement in the function 
sub-cluster shows the value of the agreement for the overall respondent or by 
category, which is indicated by the significant p-value.
Regarding the CBDC motive sub-cluster, the respondents generally agreed 
that “transaction” (40%) is the most important element, followed by “interparty 
trust” (25%), then the “saving/investment” and “precautionary” (14%), and finally 
the “philanthropy” element (6%). Meanwhile, the value of the rater agreement in 
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the motive sub-cluster conveys the value of the agreement for the categories of 
academician, practitioners, regulators and overall respondents or per category, as 
shown by the p-values, which are significant at 1% and 5% levels.
The “characteristic sub-cluster” ANP results show that “universally accepted” 
(44%) is the most important element, followed by “non-yield bearing” and “peer 
to peer” (19%), “pseudonymous” (10%) and, finally, the element of “anonymity” 
(7%). The value of the rater agreement in the characteristic sub-cluster shows 
the agreement value for the academic category and overall respondents or per 
category, as shown by the significant p-values at 1% and 5% levels.
Based on the highest inconsistency score of the respondents’ pairwise 
comparison answers for the relationship between clusters in the ANP network, we 
conclude that the consistency of the objective, function, characteristic and motive 
sub-cluster index results for the two-layer ANP with BOCR approach meet the 
consistency requirement because the inconsistency value is less than 10%.
B3. Priority Cluster in BOCR
 The ANP results (see Table 4) for the entire BOCR cluster that has been processed 
and analysed show that the top priority or the most important sub-cluster in the 
formation of the CBDC model in Indonesia is benefit (34%). This is followed by the 
risk sub-cluster (30%), then opportunities and costs (18%). The value of the rater 
agreement in the BOCR cluster shows the agreement value for all respondents or 
per category, as indicated by the significant p-value at 5%. 
Table 4.
Two-layer ANP with BOCR Cluster
This table shows the geometric mean value to see the priority value of each category of respondents, the value of 
agreement level based on Kendall’s W and the value of the consistency level of answers based on the inconsistency 
value in the BOCR Criteria cluster. Note that, *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.
Practitioner Academicians Regulator All R
 1. Benefits 0.272 0.415 0.360 0.340 1
 2. Opportunities 0.185 0.189 0.214 0.182 3
 3. Costs 0.185 0.172 0.190 0.178 4
 4. Risks 0.357 0.225 0.237 0.300 2
 Inconsistency 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004
 Kendall’s W 0.144 0.189 0.186 0.156
 X2  2.600  3.400  3.350  8.450 
 p-value  0.457  0.334  0.341  0.038** 
Based on the highest inconsistency value of the respondents’ pairwise 
comparison answers for the relationships between sub-clusters in the ANP 
network, as shown in Table 4, we conclude that the consistency of the BOCR 
cluster index test results for the one and two-layer ANP satisfies the consistency 
requirement because the inconsistency value is less than 10%.
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B4. Priority Sub-Cluster in BOCR
The ANP results for the BOCR sub-criteria (see Table 5) show that the respondents 
generally agreed that the most important element in the benefit cluster is 
“payment system security efficiency” (31%), followed by “accounting records 
and transparency” (23%), “unbanked public access” and “centralised financial 
supervision” (16%), and finally “cost of printing and handling money” (13%). 
Furthermore, the value of the rater agreement in the benefit cluster shows the 
value of the agreement for the overall respondent or per category, as indicated by 
significant p-value at 5%.
Table 5. 
Detailed ANP BOCR Results
This table shows the geometric mean value to see the priority value of each category of respondents, the value of 
agreement level based on Kendall’s W and the value of the consistency level of answers based on the inconsistency 
value in the BOCR Criteria cluster. Note that, *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Practitioner Academicians Regulator All R
BENEFIT
 1. Efficiency & safety 0.273 0.294 0.314 0.315 1
 2. Accurate & transparant 0.268 0.232 0.237 0.230 2
 3. Efficiency in cost of printing & handling 
money 0.158 0.147 0.100 0.135 5
 4. Acces for unbanked 0.139 0.180 0.160 0.160 4
 5. Centralised financial surveilance 0.162 0.147 0.188 0.160 3
 Inconsistency 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003
 Kendall’s W 0.154 0.249 0.286 0.153
 X2 3.700 5.967 6.867 11.033
 p-value 0.448 0.202 0.143 0.026**
OPPORTUNITY
 1. KYC principles & AML/CFT 0.146 0.098 0.130 0.116 1
 2. Limiting private DC 0.084 0.055 0.130 0.086 4
 3. Financial inclusion 0.102 0.124 0.094 0.116 3
 4. Reduce asymmetric info 0.111 0.140 0.073 0.116 2
 5. Monetary instrument 0.057 0.082 0.073 0.065 5
 Inconsistency 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.008
 Kendall’s W 0.111 0.140 0.358 0.130
 X2 2.667 3.367 8.600 9.389
 p-value 0.615 0.498 0.072* 0.052*
COSTS
 1. Initial infrastructure cost 0.213 0.174 0.243 0.196 3
 2. Access on tech 0.213 0.210 0.376 0.214 1
 3. New tech & mechanism 0.196 0.125 0.127 0.196 5
 4. Socialization 0.182 0.334 0.127 0.196 2
 5. Technological issues 0.196 0.157 0.127 0.196 4
 Inconsistency 0.000 0.007 0.003 0.003
 Kendall’s W 0.155 0.167 0.203 0.090
 X2 3.713 4.000 4.867 6.449
 p-value 0.446 0.406 0.301 0.168
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In the BOCR sub-criteria, respondents agreed that the most important elements 
in the opportunity cluster are “KYC AML/CFT” (12%), “reducing asymmetric and 
financial information” (12%), “limiting private digital currency” (9%), and “Non-
conventional monetary policy instruments” (7%). The value of the rater agreement 
in the opportunity cluster shows the value of the agreement both in the regulator 
category, as well as, the overall respondents or per category, as indicated by the 
p-values.
Besides, the detailed ANP results for the BOCR sub-criteria indicate that 
the respondents generally agreed that the most important element in the costs 
cluster is “technology access” (21%), followed by “unsafe from technology issues”, 
“socialisation and community communication”, “initial costs-infrastructure”, and 
“new mechanism technology”, all recording the same value of 20%. The value of the 
rater agreement in the costs cluster shows the value of no agreement for the overall 
respondent or by category, which is supported by the insignificant p-values. The 
other detailed ANP results for the BOCR sub-criteria (see Table 5, “All” Column) 
show that the respondents generally agreed that the most important element in 
the risks cluster is “cyber risk” (33%), followed by “technology-dependent” (25%), 
“speed up bank run” (18%), “people behaviour/mindset” (15%), and “impaired 
lending” (10%). The value of the rater agreement in the risks sub-cluster shows the 
value of the agreement for the category, as indicated by the significant p-value at 
10%.
Based on the highest inconsistency value of the respondents’ pairwise 
comparison answers for the relationships between clusters in the ANP network 
(see Table 5,”all” Column), we conclude that benefit, opportunity, cost and 
risks sub-cluster index for the two-layer ANP with BOCR meets the consistency 
requirements because the inconsistency value is less than 10%.
C. The Selected CBDC Design: A Synthesis of the BOCR Approach
To select the best CBDC design from the different alternatives, we use Saaty and 
Vargas’s (2006) approach, which compares the benefits with costs instead of using 
a supermatrix. We modified their benefits–costs ratio by including opportunity 
and risk. Table 6 shows the results of the BOCR assessment for alternative 
Table 5. 
Detailed ANP BOCR Results (Continued)
Practitioner Academicians Regulator All R
RISKS
 1. Tech-dependence 0.219 0.310 0.243 0.246 2
 2. Cyber risk 0.27 0.310 0.376 0.328 1
 3. People behavior 0.205 0.126 0.127 0.148 4
 4. Speed up bank run 0.219 0.126 0.127 0.176 3
 5. Impaired lending 0.087 0.126 0.127 0.103 5
 Inconsistency 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.000
 Kendall’s W 0.354 0.224 0.199 0.084
 X2 8.500 5.367 4.767 6.022
 p-value 0.075* 0.252 0.312 0.197
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specifications of the CBDC model. The best specification of the CBDC model is the 
one with the highest estimated value.
In order to evaluate the best model for the BOCR approach, we use several 
BOCR-based formulas, following the Naenna and Jiamruangjarus (2016), Simelyte 
et al. (2014), and Wijnmalen (2007), namely additive, probabilistic additive, 
subtractive, multiplicative priority powers, and multiplicative formulas. The 
results are shown in Table 6. We use a multiplicative formula in order to determine 











priority powers Additive Multiplicative
1. Cash Like 0.2076 0.3468 0.2048 0.2923 0.2035
2. GP-Indirect-NIB 0.1987 0.1757 0.2004 0.2440 0.1731
3. WH-Direct-IB 0.1937 0.0780 0.1914 0.1487 0.1766
4. WH-Direct-NIB 0.1939 0.0823 0.1925 0.1490 0.1823
5. GP-Direct-IB 0.2061 0.3171 0.2109 0.1660 0.2643
Figure 3.
ANP Results–Short-Term Alternative








1Cash Like 2GP, Indirect, NIB 3WH, Direct, IB 4WH, Direct, NIB 5GP, Direct, IB
Based on Figure 3 above, we conclude that the most prominent model chosen 
by respondents in the short term is Model 5, namely GP, direct and interest-bearing. 
In addition, the second most prominent is Model 1 (cash-like), followed by Model 4 
(WH, direct and non-interest-bearing), Model 3 (WH, direct and interest-bearing), 
and Model 2 (GP, indirect and non-interest-bearing). Thus, when it comes to the 
initial appeal of CBDC use from the community’s perspective, Model 5 can be a 
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public alternative to replacing the private digital currency. However, this model 
cannot be used in the long-run because it can potentially cause the transfer of bank 
deposits to the CBDC (bank deposit outflow) and change the banking system to 
narrow banking. If there is a significant bank deposit outflow, then banks can no 
longer rely on liabilities in the form of public savings.
Figure 4.
ANP Results – Long Term Alternative







1Cash Like 2GP, Indirect, NIB 3WH, Direct, IB 4WH, Direct, NIB 5GP, Direct, IB
From Figure 4, we can conclude that the best model chosen by the respondents 
in the long term is Model 1, namely cash-like, which is followed by Model 5 (GP, 
direct and interest-bearing), Model 2 (GP, indirect and non-interest-bearing), 
Model 3 (WH and interest-bearing), and Model 4 (WH, indirect and interest-
bearing). 
The choice of the cash-like model is appropriate because the cash-like CBDC 
design involves high fees and thus requires a relatively long period of preparation. 
Besides, the chosen cash-like CBDC design is in accordance with the predictions 
of Six Group (2019), which argues that cash-like currency will replace currency 
as a medium of exchange. However, currency will continue to be used as 
a store of value and thus physical money will still be used. This is based on a 
consideration of the need for business process sustainability in the event of power 
disruptions, natural disasters, and others. Therefore, PwC (2019) added that any 
consideration for issuing CBDC by the central bank should not ignore currency 
but rather develop alternative payment methods and options for saving money. 
Furthermore, the cash-like design chosen by experts in Indonesia is in line with 
the notion of CBDC issuance as a method of payment that is not concerned with 
convenience for consumers based on digitalisation trends. This is in line with the 
view of RBNZ (2018), which argue that the most suitable characteristics of CBDC 
are the cash-like model. These relate to the characteristics of digital currency in 
that it can be exchanged in cash, it can be accessed by the public without certain 
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restrictions, the public cannot borrow from the central bank, and the central bank 
does not pay interest on digital currency.
D. Robustness Checks
We examine the robustness of our results using two methods. First, we vary the 
BOCR approach to see whether the results are sensitive to this variation. Second, 
we compare the two-layer ANP results with the one-layer ANP results.
D1. Sensitivity of the Results to Variation in BOCR
In this sensitivity analysis, we examine whether the results are sensitive to the 
specification of the BOCR. Following (Saaty, 2006), we vary the relationship in 
terms of benefits, opportunities, costs and risks, and report the results in Figure 
5. Figures 5 shows that each model experiences insignificant changes when the 
relationship changes (i.e. benefit, opportunity, cost, and risk). The changes that 
arise do not alter the order and we thus conclude that Model 1 is the best result 
based on the ratings given by the respondents.
Figure 5.
Sensitivity BOCR Graph
This figure shows the value of the sensitivity of the model when it is connected to the sub-cluster of benefits, 
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Figure 5.
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D2. One-layer ANP Results
To avoid any subjectivity associated with the BOCR weights, we also estimate one-
layer ANP with the BOCR approach, and examine whether the results change as 
we alter the model specification.
Figure 6 shows that most of the respondents (representing 35% of the 
population) preferred the cash-like model (Model 1), followed by the Model 2 
(26%), Models 3 and 4 (14%), and Model 5 (11%). In other words, the one-layer 
ANP model, like the two-layer ANP model, reveals that the cash-like model is the 
most important model (see Figure 6). Hence, our baseline results, which are based 
on the two-layer ANP with BOCR, are robust. We can conclude that the cash-like 
model is the best CBDC model for Indonesia. 
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the Delphi–ANP approach, we show that the most considered strategic 
criteria in CBDC issuance, particularly related to the smoothness of the payment 
system, in Indonesia is objective. This is followed by the benefits (mainly related to 
payment system efficiency and security), risk (primarily cyber risk), opportunity, 
and cost. Our Delphi–ANP approach, which draws on BOCR methods to quantify 
a basket of experts’ opinions revealed that the cash-like CBDC model is the most 
suitable model, as it conforms to Indonesia’s conditions. The cash-like CBDC 
model has similar characteristics as traditional currencies, which are universally 
accessible, ensure anonymity, flexible to operate on peer-to-peer basis, as well as, 
online, and non-yield bearing. 
Figure 6.
ANP Results – Alternative ANP Floor 1
This figure shows the results of ANP BOCR 1 Floor in the CBDC Alternative Model Cluster
1Cash Like 2GP, Indirect, NIB 3WH, Direct, Int-Bearing
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Apart from finding that the most preferred model is cash-like CBDC, a token-
based general-purpose CBDC, which has no interest-bearing attributes, we also 
found that the second-best model to be implemented in Indonesia is general-
purpose direct interest-bearing CBDC. In a broad sense, these findings have a 
similarity with the CBDC design developed by PBoC in 2020, which is a general-
purpose model. PwC (2019) suggests that the current Indonesian fintech industry 
landscape is similar with early developments of fintech in China in 2013. Hence, the 
general-purpose CBDC model might have comparative advantages to traditional 
currency in terms of reducing the cost of printing and handling money, while also 
minimising the impact of shadow banking, which often becomes a challenge in 
emerging economies (Shirai, 2019).
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